- Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind
- Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Michael Inwood - Google книги
- Hegel: Philosophy of Mind: Translated with Introduction and Commentary
His Philosophy of Mind is one of the main pillars of his thought. Michael Inwood, highly respected for his previous work on Hegel, presents this central work to the modern reader in an accurate new translation supported by a philosophically sophisticated editorial introduction and elucidating scholarly commentary. Inwood has provided a much-improved translation of an absolutely central text, along with a helpful set of notes that provide a fine starting-point for genuine historical and contemporary engagement with one of Hegel's most rewarding works. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Academic Skip to main content. Clark and J. Skinner Lichtenstein, E. Beriaschwili, M. Lectures on the History of Philosophy , vol. Haldane, E. Seidman ed. Reynolds and Eunice Paul Vieillard-Baron, J-L. Natural Law , tr. Knox, pp. Brown and Stewart, pp. Strauss, L. Peperzak, Adriaan 'Hegel and Hobbes revisited', in A.
Collins ed Hegel on the Modern World. Buchwalter, A. Spinoza  Ethics. H Burkhardt. Beck, L. Bell, D. Beiser, F. Walther, M. Including Hegel's debates with those who accused him of atheism and pantheism. Science of Logic , tr. Lectures on the History of Philosophy , tr.
Haldane and Simson, vol. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion , vol. Whittemore, R. Parkinson, G. Lauer, Quentin Hegels' Concept of God , ch. Yovel, Y. Byrne, L. Solomon, R. Atlas, S. See also 'French Revolution'.
Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind
See also 'Social contract theory: Hegel's critique'. See also 'Freedom in Hegel'. Phenomenology ch. Haldane and Simpson, vol. Bloch, Ernst Subjekt-Objekt. Kelly, G. Henrich, Dieter Hegel im Kontext p44ff. Riley, Patrick Will and Political Legitimacy , chs. Fulda, H. Philonenko, A. Wokler, R. Ripstein, A. Neuhouser, F. See also 'System of needs'. Lukacs, Georg  The Young Hegel. Plant, Raymond Hegel: An Introduction , 2nd ed. Maker ed Hegel on Economics and Freedom Henderson, James P. F Hegel', in R. Tortajada ed The Economics of James Steuart.
Seth Pringle-Pattison, A. Henrich, D. Kelm, D. Sedgwick, S. See also 'Bifurcation'. Priest, S. Zimmerman, R. Kain, P. Bristow, W. Also on the contrast between Hegel's idealism and Kant's in general. See also specific sections. See also 'Kant and Fichte's theology and Hegel'. See also 'Proposition judgment , speculative proposition, language'. See also 'Metaphysics of Hegel: Kantian interpretations'.
See also 'McDowell on Hegel'. For Hegel's general critique of the Kantian standpoint see 'Bifurcation and the standpoint of modern thought, Kant's standpoint as a whole'. Faith and Knowledge , A. Miller, pp. Lectures on the History of Philosophy , volume 3, section on Kant. Maier, J. Smith, J. O'Malley et al. Hegel and the History of Philosophy Sayers, S.
Hartnack, J. Pippin, Robert B. Hegel: Critical Assessments vol. Priest ed Hegel's Critique of Kant. Pippin, Robert Hegel's Idealism , chs. Beiser ed The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. McDowell, John Mind and World. Ruggiu and L. Testa eds Hegel contemporaneo: La ricezione americana di Hegel a confronto con la tradizione europe , For apperception in Hegel's own account of self-consciousness, see 'Consciousness, Self-consciousness and the I: apperceptive interpretations'. Science of Logic , pp.
Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit - Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Michael Inwood - Google книги
Guyer, P. Funke and T. De Nys, M. Stern, D. Vendler, Zeno 'A note on the paralogisms', in G. Ryle ed Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Brook, Andrew 'Kant, self-reference and self-awareness', in A. Brook and R. Deligiorgi ed Hegel: New Directions , Schulting, D. Science of Logic 'Pure Quantity', remark 2 pp. Priest, G. Including material focusing exclusively on ch. For Hegel on form and content, and critique of Kant's formalism, see.
See also bibliography in Wood p See also 'Action and Will' and 'Duty, desire and feelings in Hegel'. Phenomenology of Spirit , ch. Bradley, F. Reyburn, H. Ritter, J. Knox, T. Walsh, W. Shklar, J. Hegel: Critical Assessments , vol. Gram, M. Stepelevich and D. Lamb eds Hegel's Philosophy of Action. O'Hagan, T. Rawls, J. Hoy, D. Stern, P. Allison, H. Westphal, K. Including Hegels' critique of Kant's divorce of morality and feeling - see also 'Duty, desire and feelings in Hegel'. Including Hegel on form generating content in ethics. Knox , pp. Stern ed G.
Pippin, R. Wood, Allen Kant's Ethical Thought , ch. Freyenhagen, Fabian 'Empty, dangerous and useless? Recent Kantian replies the empty formalism objection;, Hegel Bulletin 32 Hahn, Songsuk 'Logical form and ethical content', Hegel Bulletin 32 With dates of publication. Fichte [Feb ] The Aenesidimus review, in G. Breazeale Fichte  'Some lectures concerning the scholar's vocation', in Early Philosophical Writings , tr.
Heath and Lachs. Fichte, J. Daniel Breazeale. Fichte  The Vocation of Man , sec. Smith, , available online. Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings , tr. Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings , tr. See also D. Breazeale, 'English Fichte bibliography' in D. Breazeale and T. Each issue of the North American's Fichtean Society's newletter Fichteana has a bibliography of recent work on Fichte.
See also the society's bibliography of Fichte's works in English translation. Smith, ed D. Introduction available online. Copleston, F. Tabor, J. Jalloch, C. Breazeale, D. Breazale, D. Solomon and K. Higgins eds Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume 6: The Age of German Idealism. Seidel, G. Martin, W. Beiser, Frederick German Idealism , part 2. Daniel Breazeale, section 6. Kant  'Open letter on Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre' , in I.
Kant, Philosophical Correspondence , , tr. Zweig Lachs, J. Mandt, A. Taber, J. Reid, J. Christensen et al. Henrich, Dieter  'Fichte's "I"', Sententiae 31 2 , Philonenko, Alexis L'Oeuvre de Fichte , ch. Pippin, Robert 'Fichte's contribution' in Philosophical Forum 19 , revised as ch. Neuhouser, Frederick Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity.
Ameriks, Karl Kant and the Fate of Autonomy , ch. Kelm and G. La Vopa, A. Breazeale, Daniel 'Check or checkmate? On the finitude of the Fichtean self', in K. Ameriks and D. Sturma eds The Modern Subject. Emundts and S. Including the relation between ethics and right. Renaut, A. Shell, S. Williams, R. Ferry, L. Philip , ch. Williams, Robert R. Beck, G. Nakhimovsky, I.
First to third theorems in FNR. For material on the necessity of a second self-conscious subject specifically see 'Fichte on intersubjectivity'. Wolff, E. Herbert, G. Fischbach, F. Nowak-Juchacz, E. Mather, Ronald 'On the concepts of recognition', Fichte-Studien Nomer, Nedim 'Fichte and the relationship between self-positing and rights', Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 4. Second theorem in FNR, and elsewhere. Fichte', Archives de Philosophie Hunter, Charles K.
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- Summary of Hegel's Philosophy of Mind!
- Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit: Translated with introduction and commentary.
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Wolff, and Rainer Zaczyk. Jacobi and German idealism', in A. Franks, P. Redding, Paul Hegel's Hermeneutics , ch. Herbert, Gary 'Fichte's deduction of rights from self-consciousness', Interpretation 25 2. Moggach, Douglas 'Reciprocity, elicitation, recognition: the thematics of intersubjectivity in the early Fichte', Dialogue 38 2. Neuhouser, Frederick ''Introduction' to J. Giassi, L. Beinenstock and M. Crampe-Casnabet eds Dans quelle mesure la philosophie est pratique.
Fichte, Hegel. Beiser, Frederick German Idealism , part 2 ch. Scribner, F. Scott "The 'subtle matter' of intersubjectivity in the Grundlage des Naturrechts ', in D. Siemek, Marek J. Wood, Allen 'Fichte's intersubjective I', Inquiry 49 1. McNulty, Jacob 'Transcendental philosophy and intersubjectivity: mutual recognition as a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness in sections 1—3 of Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right ', European Journal of Philosophy 24 4.
Neuhouser, Frederick 'Fichte and the relationship between right and morality', in D. Perru, O. Patten, Alan Hegel's Idea of Freedom ch. Ferry, Luc 'The distinction between law and ethics in the early philosophy of Fichte', Philosophical Forum 19 James, David , 'The relation of right to morality in Fichte's Jena theory of the state and society', History of European Ideas Miller pp.
Haldane and Simson vol. Siep, Ludwig Hegels Fichtekritik und die Wissenschaftslehre von Taylor, Charles Hegel , ch. Solomon, Robert In the Spirit of Hegel , chs. For Schelling see 'Schelling'. Werner, A. Hegel and Friedrich Schlegel. Frank, M. Including Schelling on recognition. Schelling, F. Marti Peterson Heath Vater, Philosophical Forum 31 4 , Vater, Philosophical Forum 31 4 , , see section 2.
Harris and P. Bowie See also 'Schellingian critiques of Hegel'. Feuerbach, L. Stepelevich ed The Young Hegelians , pp. Heidegger [19? Marx, W. Schelling: History, System, Freedom. White, A. Bowie, A. Snow, D. Beierwaltes W. Sturma, Dieter 'The nature of subjectivity: the critical and systematic function of Schelling's philosophy of nature', in S.
Lawrence, J. For intellectual intuition in Fichte see 'Fichte on self-consciousness and intellectual intuition'. Vater, Philosophical Forum 31 4 , co-authored by Hegel , see section 2. Heath , introduction and part 1 available online Williams see esp. See also 'Schellingian critique of Hegel'. Nauen, F. Essays and Letters on Theory , ed.
Pfau, Olson, A. Rosenkranz, K. Haym, R. Althaus, H. Pinkard, Terry Hegel: A Biography. Haering, T. Hyppolite, J. Lukacs, G. Asveld, P. Wylleman, A. Crites, S. Lacorte, C. Tarsh , ch. Pinkard Hegel: A Biography , chs. Wahl, J. Kaufmann, Walter 'Hegel's antitheological phase', Philosophical Review Young, W.
Tarsh , chs. Bondeli, M. Adams, G.
Hegel: Philosophy of Mind: Translated with Introduction and Commentary
This is the attempt to establish the existence and properties of God and the essential doctrines of religion on the basis of reason. Rousseau, J. Reimarus  Fragments originally published as Fragmente des Wolfenbuttelschen ungenannten.
Lessing, G. Pfleiderer, O. Shanks, A. For the 'Essay on natural law' see 'Essay on natural law'. For recognition in these works see 'Recognition in the Jena writings'. For politics and ethics of the Phenomenology see 'Moral and political stance of the Phenomenology '. Essay on Natural Law. System of Ethical Life. First Philosophy of Spirit first Jena system. Hegel and the Human Spirit third Jena system. Habermas, J. Kimmerle, H. Horstmann, R.
Verene ed Hegel's Social and Political Thought. Rose, G. Gerard, G. Wood, Allen Hegel's Ethical Thought , ch. Cruysberghis, P. Bourgeois, B. In his early and later political philosophy, and both classical natural law based on the idea of nature and modern natural law based on the ideas of freedom, will and reason; for the former see also 'Greek philosophy in general and Hegel', for the latter see also 'Will and freedom as the basis of the Philosophy of Right '.
For Aquinas, see 'Aquinas and Hegel'. Bobbio, N. Riedel ed Materialien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie vol. Pelczynski ed Hegel's Political Philosophy. Mitias, M. Burns, T. Fonnesu, L. Wright, Kathleen 'The identity of identity and non-identity', Idealistic Studies Recognition is 'acknowledging someone as something'; intersubjectivity is the constitution of subjectivity or selfhood, or of a certain sort of self, or of a certain self-conception, through relations between subjects.
For this see headings with that phrase in them. For Hegel's concept of spirit and the sociality of the self see respectively 'Spirit' and 'Community and individual, sociality of the self in Hegel'. For recognition in Hegel's work as a whole, and for Fichte-Hegel comparisons on recognition, see 'Recognition in the Jena writings'. See 'Fichte on recognition and the relation of right'.
See also 'Life in Hegel's mature system'. Hegel, 'Two fragments of on love', Clio 8 2 , Marcuse, H. Eley ed Hegels Theorie des Subjektiven Geistes. Freiberger, E. Ormiston A. Schmidt am Busch and C. Laitinen eds Recognition and Social Ontology. Anderson, Sybol S. Sorensen, A.
Cobben, Paul G. For ethics and politics in general in the Jena works see 'Jena writings politics, ethics and religion '. For recognition specifically in Phenomenology see 'Recognition in the Phenomenology'. For labour see 'Labour in Hegel'. Cerf , pp. Hegel  Natural Law , second part. This is how we are anchored in the universe, immersed in a social life and a cultural milieu, and tied to our ordinary, earthly existence. It is not an ascetic ideal aspiring to purity and dependent on mere intellectual concentration. It should be noticed that the worldly dimension of the spirit does not manifest itself primarily in economics, as in Calvinism, but in more solidary forms of social life like the family and civil society, leading to citizenship and the state.
Economics per se is for Hegel the domain of particular interests fighting a war of all against all, and therefore lacks spirit. Spirit is realized in our world, but for Hegel as for Luther, though not in the same Christian sense our world — this world — is not merely an inferior, contingent being: our world is the em- bodiment of Spirit with a capital S.
Even absolute Knowing, the top intellectual and existential state, is not severed from the rest of this worldly life, but is realized through it. Modernists and Alienation As I mentioned above, a central concern of Hegel, especially in the Phenomenology, was to reconstruct, and thereby redeem, those areas of modern life that have been damaged and undermined by mod- ern rationality — community, family, custom, work, the sense of a well-anchored self, of political and social belonging, the assurance of meaning in life and the universe — and in doing so, to make reason itself restore the broken unity on a different and higher plane.
The 6 Introduction goal was, in other words, to transform modern self-conscious ratio- nality from a destabilizing and alienating element into a construc- tive and invigorating force: the same reason that had produced the rift must repair it from its own resources.
It was obvious to Hegel that the new unity could not be as compact and immediate as the lost unity had been — there is no turning back from modernity in Hegel, no romantic, conservative nostalgia toward the past. To put it differently: the problem of severance and alienation is not unique to the social domain in Hegel. This problem has become particularly pressing in early phases of modernity, and must be re- solved by high modernity. Ethical life — the modem reconstruction of social and political relations and institu- tions, and thereby of a concrete human subjectivity — prepares and makes possible the redemptive element in philosophical Knowing, but cannot replace it.
To view the social domain, with its outward- looking activity and business, as substitute for the ontological and existential concerns is to escape or repress the issue rather than face it; and repression, which splits the self further, cannot be the solution. This said, we should nevertheless remember that absolute Knowing is not a detached intellectual activity. Hegelian self-knowl- edge rides on a substrate of a socially engaged and affective life, and always involves the intermediation of theory and practice. This is due in part to the social dimension of the human self, whose individuality is mediated by intersubjective relations, and partly to the affective character, that of a lived experience, which rationality has in Hegel.
The Hegelian self is gradually constituted and known to itself through involvement and interaction with other selves within a common world of work, language, conflict over recognition, love, shared beliefs, social institutions, religious symbols and cult, and other forms of concrete life which, by nature, are entwined with affective elements: emotions, drives, and moods.
There, Hegel had stressed the practical basis of cognitive reason, as a kind of ethical self-understanding that mediates the theoretical. But this does not indicate the primacy of practical reason, as in Kant or 2 These lectures were particularly emphasized by Siep, Habermas, and Hon- net. It is a kind of prereflective reflection that occurs through the experience of living, working, entering into social con- flict and intercourse, and so forth.
But then, a reflective, philosophi- cal comprehension is said to grow from this soil. Social philosophy can have this rela- tive independence because it cannot be derived from ontology, al- though it cannot be fully understood without it. With them, collapses our broader initial attempt — to capture the actually real directly, and through a cognitive and representa- tional attitude merely. This turn, which results in a struggle for recognition and a dialectic of subjugation and liberation, leads me to seek the actually real and individual in my own self, which, however, turns out to be equally abstract, split from itself alienated , and not given immediately.
Introduction 9 Self-consciousness, as we discover, is far from being Cartesian, or even Kantian; its dynamic of being makes it depend on its own social and cognitive evolution. And this opens a vast new domain — practical, social, and cognitive history — whose evolution is the ter- rain that allows self-consciousness, including philosophical self- knowledge, to arise in several levels and degrees. Through this pro- cess, new forms of interpreting the real arise and are replaced, until a Knowing of the actually real — and the true, individual self, both in the social and the ontic sense — is made possible, a Knowing whose dialectic no longer undermines its results but reinforces them, and thereby becomes self-sustaining, or absolute.
This is an ontological journey — toward the constitution and rec- ognition of the transperspectival the no-longer-relative, or abso- lutely true meaning of the real i. In taking this crucial turn, we express a tacit recogni- tion that the question, What does it mean to actually be? What does it take to actually be — to which a shorthand answer is: It takes living and being involved in a society, one that, despite inevitable regressions, eventually leads to freedom and mutual recognition. Yet this evolution is not the answer itself, only a prerequisite to it. Here, too, we go at first through a failed immediacy and abstraction.
Here again, discovering subjectivity entails, beyond Kant, the discovery of sociality and the other subject as mediating 10 Introduction our relations with the object; but this is a dimension of the search for actuality and not a substitute for it. The logic of the Concept, or rather the Idea, is mediated by the natural and the social dimensions of the Idea but, for Hegel, transcends them both. As men- tioned earlier, Hegel sees something greater going on in human history than merely contingent societies and cultures expressing and justifying their modes of life in their reflective creations philos- ophy, art, religion : there is an encompassing rational, even divine, principle that is actualized through their combined theory and practice.
This encompassing principle, Spirit writ large — in its uni- versal sense 3 — transcends aufhebt the objective socialized, institu- tional dimension of spirit toward the realization, and manifesta- tion, of the absolute meaning of being. Introduction 11 is not univocal. Spirit writ large, the immanent Hegelian divinity, is the uni- fyng, or totalizing, principle of all these developments, their under- lying and self-displaying meaning, which informs the process and, at the same time, is also constituted and revealed by it.
As such, spirit is not foreign to nature — to the seemingly inert, thing-like being of the world — but is its dialectical outgrowth and evolution. Hegel thus assigns to human history an ontic role. When philo-sophia turns into sophia, spirit would have achieved a centuries-long project of realizing and making manifest the overall meaning of existence, its self-understanding and vindication. In Hegel, his immanent ontology supplies this ground by attributing to nature itself a dynamic, self-differentiating subject- like mode of being.
The Hegelian dialectic remains cruelly sober and realistic to the end. Neither war, nor evil, suffering, violence, irrationality, or metaphysical contingency can ever be totally eliminated, because negativity remains constitutive of the positive result, even in its absolute form. Yet the rational principle has the upper hand.
Introduction 13 is no personification of the revealed meaning of being, or of the underlying principle that makes its emerging possible. Hegelian spirit, even at its highest point, remains embodied in empirical per- sons, societies, books, cults, works of art, and the like. There is no transcendence even at the end. Nor is there a valid way to peel off one aspect of his thought as the "true" or "actual" Hegel. Of course, the structural parallels in the system make it easy to identify the marks of one issue in another, and from here to claim that what goes on in one area of the system is "in truth" a discus- sion of the other.
But such hermeneutical moves are dubi- ous. The Logic , as a "kingdom of shadows," is meant to contain the conceptual skeleton which nature and spirit flesh out in their di- verse subsystems; therefore, observing analogies between these do- mains should not impress us as a "discovery"; we should rather be surprised if we noticed no such analogies. But this does not make it a superperson with particular thoughts and intentions.
As given, then, these ironic dicta have a real, important reference and a delusive, vacuous meaning. They bear from the outset a false and a true promise at the same time, which clash at first, creating puzzlement, yet can and must be separated for actual knowledge to proceed. The view above creates a problem for an interpreter who wishes to explicate the historical Hegel as faithfully as possible, yet does not share his organistic view of philosophical discourse.
Inevitably, I shall use the good old predicative language, knowing that an or- thodox Hegelian if any is left will call my text a mere konversation about Hegel rather than expressing the Sache selbst. The Absolute as Subject The single most important sentence in the Preface reads: According to my way of seeing. Hegel declared this synthesis to be the final goal of his philosophy, and viewed it as a task defining philosophical modernity in general.
The attempt, in various and some- times opposing ways, to establish a union between Kant and Spi- Introduction 17 noza is visible in the work of Fichte, the early Schelling, Hegel himself, Schopenhauer, some of the Left Young Hegelians, and, in a less obvious way, Marx.
God is immanent in the world, and identical with its total- ity, yet he is not therefore a mere thing, not substance or nature only, but a spiritual process, as well. Moreover, God as spirit is not external to men and women; he is not some separate, sublime subject over and above them, but is embodied in human history and human culture, and evolves within and through them. See note 6 above. With these background remarks in mind, let me now turn to the two main aphorisms of the Preface. But first, a word about their role in discourse. The Paradox of Aphorisms It is ironic that Hegel should use aphorisms to explain his ideas, he who, in the same text — indeed, in those very aphorisms— -denies the possibility of saying anything significant about philosophy in a single generalized statement.
Such a statement, in addition to lack- ing truth, fails to contain the meaning that it claims to convey. Truth and meaning require an evolving context; hence, they can arise only at the end, as a result of the full explication and self- tranformation of the idea that the general statement purports to enounce, but inevitably misses. Nevertheless, Hegel happily uses those inadequate means of philosophical communication as intro- ject is strictly speaking a metaphor, a Judeo-Christian religious Vorstellung, pro- duced by the imagination, which represents the philosophical Concept in images.
No less important, Hegel has a general problem with philosophi- cal language. On the one hand he has a strong systematic reason for denying the propriety in philosophical discourse of using the predicative proposition which is built as a unilateral dependence of a predicate on a subject ; yet on the other hand, he has an equally systematic reason against devising a special, nonnatural language for philosophy.
Philosophical discouse, being rooted in society and its history, cannot be severed from the actual historical languages in which philosophy has evolved, and these are all predicative in character and thereby captive of Verstand, abstract rationality. Since no theoretical resolution of this antinomy is possible, Hegel turns to practical solutions, like using the whole paragraph, and even larger portions of a chapter or an oral explication. This tech- nique allows for the back-and-forth movement, the looping, the undermining of what has just been said, so as to progress to a higher viewpoint that Hegel's dialectic requires and for which it is both famous and notorious.
Using blatantly predicative aphorisms may be another device of coping with the antinomy of language. These aphorisms are funda- mentally self-refuting; what they say contradicts what they are and seem to perform; so they must either explode when taken at face value , or their indicative appearance must be bypassed, so that, as merely evocative proverbs, they will serve to allude to what offi- cially they must fail to convey. Either way, these aphorisms are meant to do a preparatory rhetorical work, in helping clear the way for the dialectical mode of thinking.
For this reason, absolute being is a result — of its own movement and process of self-becoming. It is therefore also a pur- posive process, which has itself — in its actualized essence — as the immanent goal of its movement. Being-as-subject knows itself, and this knowledge actualizes being according to its true essence. To grasp this profound and difficult idea we must note that the movement in question is not only the movement of something in being, but the movement of being itself — its development toward higher levels of actuality.
In its higher stages it is a historical movement — the movement of culture, practical life, so- cial forms, and institutions, and of the consciousness they express or embody. And at still a higher stage this is the movement of self- consciousness, pure contemplative cognition, and absolute Spirit. An Aristotelian idea is hiding in the background of this Hegelian view.
There are several degrees of being, and reality evolves from one to the other until it attains energeia, actuality, or "entelechy. For Aristotle, God as the unity of the knower and the known exists outside man and even outside the universe, or at least at its limit. Also, the Aristotelian God enjoys his perfect state from eternity to eternity, with no relation to time and the particular items of existence. For Hegel, however, God is immanent; he exists only in time and within the world, and attains his perfect state through human culture and its evolution.
The subjectivity of being thus has two complementary senses in Hegel: a the self-actualizing movement of being; and b the self- 12 Cf. Both senses are united at the highest stage, where being is fully actualized through Knowing itself. This occurs through human philosophy, religion, and art. In philosophy, truth is not the Concept's adequacy with external real- ity. Truth is, first of all, the adequacy of reality with its own inner Concept, that is, its end. Truth is therefore an ontic state, and not a state of consciousness merely.
It is linked to the process of the actualization of being and its several degrees. He means that the higher stage does not only disclose what is contained in the lower one, but thereby also actualizes it. The Subject and Self-Negation Another important way of viewing the absolute as subject concerns the structure of the movement by which being is actualized, and the role negation fulfills within it.
This has direct relevance to the logic and method of philosophy. The difference lies in the subject's characteristic activity, which is to negate, or produce negation. This negation is first directed at the subject itself, and at any content or definite state with which the subject seems initially to be identified.
The subject therefore exists as distinguished from itself, it transcends its own particular states and negates any immediacy that exists within it or is attributed to it. Yet even this positive activity is performed through another negation. It presupposes a series of negations which do not return the process to its point of departure, but rather each negation constitutes a new state of affairs, and a new state of consciousness. Yet this is a selfhood in the process of becoming, a selfhood which will not actually exist until it reaches the end of the road.
In other words, as long as the process is still ongoing there is no actual subject. Self-Identity Hegel makes a crucial distinction between the identity of a sub- stance and the identity attributed to a subject. Its self-identity must be understood as an activity of self identification, which takes place through the mediation of otherness and is attained only at the end of the process. Therefore, as mentioned above, the subject is not immediately self-identical, but acquires and constitutes its identity both through the complete process and as its result.
And Spinoza, following Descartes, presented God himself as substance and as thing res , which does not think and has no I. Absolute being itself has the structure of a subject. It, too, is not from the outset that which it will ultimately become, but proceeds towards itself through its opposites — namely, through multiplicity and otherness. Thereby, Hegel breaks away from the boundaries of the Kantian critique of reason — which re- quires the subject to have an external source for all its particular contents — and gives the subject a daring ontological and also theo- logical interpretation.
In Reinhold and Fichte, following Kant, these constituent elements of conscious- ness seem to be simultaneous; in Kant — and certainly in Hegel — some of them are preconditions to others. Thus, Hegel uses the Kantian model of the subject — with a crucial change — in order to explicate not only the ontology of finite, conditioned beings, as Kant did, but also the ontology of the infinite, absolute Being.
This idea is hard to understand, and even harder to accept, when considering the particular I in separation from the broader context of the spirit; in other words, when trying to understand the issue in purely epistemological terms. Who in his or her right mind would agree that, for instance, the particular contents of our sensa- tion, or the contingent facts which face us and lie beyond our con- trol, have their material source in our own consciousness?
Many interpreters struggling with this problem have attributed to Hegel a mystical position, according to which consciousness spontaneously particularizes itself into the rich, manifold system of the world. I think we might better understand Hegel by realizing that his philos- ophy is not primarily concerned with epistemology of the individ- ual mind, but with the ontology and history of the universal spirit. Introduction 23 opment rather than being a mere assemblage, which Hegel says both Aristotle and Kant have offered.
To be sure, the particular individual will always see such contents as contingent and external; but here the process of philosophy comes in, whereby the individual sets out to understand herself, her history, the formation of her consciousness, and thereby reaches the point where she views these ingredients as belonging to her own identity and not as contingent and imposed by accident.
For this to happen, the individual must attain a self- consciousness which grasps her connection to the whole of spirit; and she must be living in a period that is not completely alienated, and within circumstances that allow the individual, in great mea- sure, to rationally identify with the basic ingredients of her social, political, and cultural environment.
In such a case Hegel would say that the particular contents of reality are not external and contingent even for the individual. The Absolute as a Totality-in-Becoming As we have mentioned above, absolute being, because it is a subject, is not immediately identical with itself, nor is it a static, finished totality — as it is for Spinoza — but exists as a becoming totality. This means that the entirety of being — the immanent God — constitutes 24 Introduction its self-identity by becoming other than itself, and by rediscovering itself both in its otherness and as the result of its own development.
More specifically, the hidden rational — indeed divine — essence of the whole of being externalizes itself in the empirical world, and exists in a variety of empirical shapes and degrees in nature and history. These shapes diverge from the rational essence in ways which cause them to oppose it and cause the essence to be alienated from itself. The result is that the essence seems to have been lost in its contradictions. Actually, however, the essence remains present and active within its contradictions, and through them continues to structure the movement of the evolving reality.
That process contin- ues until reality itself reaches a stage at which the rational essence can rediscover itself in and through the empirical world and ade- quately actualize itself. The self-actualization of spirit is equally a process of liberation. Freedom has both an ontological sense and a sociopolitical sense in Hegel, which mediate one another. Seen from the human standpoint, the process ends at the stage of Reason or freedom.
From the standpoint of being it ends with the actualization of absolute being, when the totality reaches self-under- standing through human culture and philosophy. Thus, according to Hegel, the emergence of absolute Knowing — and of human freedom — is a crucial event, not only in the history of the human race, but in the history of being itself. Introduction 25 Society and Politics as Conditions for Knowledge A central feature of Hegel's philosophy is that both the ontological process the actualization of being and the process of knowledge which serves it are carried out through social and historical evolu- tion — the evolution toward human freedom.
The subjectivity of the absolute indicates, among other things, that social and cultural life, with their various forms of private and public consciousness, are genuine modes in which being itself exists and develops. Although the climax of this development is cognitive, its major body is histori- cal and resides in social and cultural life: in the family, the commu- nity, civil society, state institutions, religion and art, collective men- tality and the psychic life of the individual within her time and sociocultural environment.
Hegel makes these the necessary sub- strates and conditions for the evolution of knowledge. Herein, as I already mentioned, lies a major Hegelian novelty. Philosophical knowledge does not occur within a separate logical space of its own, but is the conceptualization of various forms of life — social, political, mental, and so on — as they have already been realized in the world.
Knowledge depends on its own history, and also on the history of other, practical forms of culture, which are embodied in the objective world and which philosophical knowl- edge explicates. Special importance in this context is given to civil society and politics. This, to use a different Hegelian idiom, means that the domain of lived and embodied ethics Sittlichkeit — social 26 Introduction norms and customs, contractual relations, the family, law, politics, and the state — are the necessary presupposition of philosophy, and also of art and religion, the three shapes of absolute spirit.
Social, practical, and political life is based on both the external and the internal shapes by which consciousness relates to itself and to other consciousnesses. Even its relation to nature is mediated by its relation to another consciousness, since both knowing nature and using nature are socially mediated activi- ties. Conceiving the absolute as subject also has direct implications with respect to philosophical method. Before we begin to discuss this topic, however, three further remarks are required. Being is con- ceived as a single totality whose unity emerges from a synthesis of all those ontological poles and dimensions which philosophy usu- ally regards as mutually exclusive.
The Hegelian philosophy sees these poles as reciprocally constitutive of each other: unity and plurality, universality and particularity, thought and being, spirit and nature, theory and practice, intellect and will, the inner and the outer, and so on. In viewing the absolute as subject, the philosopher avoids the splitting of reality into disparate, unmediated regions, as happens in dualism, and understands each of these regions as an abstract sector, or aspect, of the one absolute being.
Nature was conceived as a living entity, a global organism endowed with Introduction 27 inner animation, rather than as an inert mass of matter in motion. Hegel shares this tendency but makes spirit rather than nature into the comprehensive One. Hegel thereby opposes the naturalism of Spinoza, from whom he nevertheless takes the princi- ple of immanent philosophy.
The overarching immanent being for Hegel is not natura nature but Geist, self-conscious spirit. Nature as such has no spirituality and is certainly not divine: Hegel would consider this to be pa- ganism. Nature is primarily an aggregate of items in space and time, each located outside the other in an inert relation which en- dows them with quantity and disposes them to measurement.
True, nature in its deeper dimension also discloses an organic, sub- ject-like structure and thereby the potentiality for spirit; yet realiz- ing that potentiality will take us outside of nature and into the domain of human culture and thought, of which, as mentioned, nature is a mere substrate. Hegel insists that this is internal knowledge, namely, knowledge which contemplates its object because it belongs to its very constitution.
Therefore, from the viewpoint of the individual philosopher, the act of philo- sophical Knowing involves her dialectical unification with the whole of being. Hegel here offers his own, rational and nonmystical version of the achievements which mysticism falsely leads its followers to 28 Introduction expect.
The finite human being, when engaged in the philosophical act of knowing and in the social and political activity which makes that act possible, is contemplating true being from within, and is an inner moment of it. This person is thereby not only united with absolute being but, in a small way, even helps to constitute it.
Philos- ophy is not a detached, analytical contemplation through the intel- lect only, but a mode of being, a living experience of the person who contemplates being from within. Yet this is no vague, isolated, romantic event, because its medium is conceptual thinking, and be- cause the thinker is equally a practical agent involved in the society and practical life through which philosophical Knowing is actualized. Thus again, the phase of absolute Knowing involves a sublation of religion and mysticism, which preserves their underlying interests.
It radically differs from mysticism while pursuing similar goals. Even at the highest stage, the individual goes on living an ordinary life in the external world, in society, in her daily work and occupation, as an active member of the polity, in the privacy of the family and the public arena of politics, without retiring into a closed inner world or being carried away by romantic enthusiasm.
Consequences for the System and Method of Philosophy The subjective nature of the absolute also has far-reaching effects on the system and method of philosophy. Because reality itself has Introduction 29 a subject-like structure, Hegel concludes that philosophical logic, which has to express that structure, must likewise have a subject- like character.
Such items in Hegel's judgment are not, however, actual beings but, as we shall see later, abstractions. True actuality is governed by another kind of logos, that of evolving, subject-like systems, which are not self-identical at the outset, and therefore do not obey the law of noncontradiction, and in which double-negation produces something new.
Hegel does not mean a formal calculus, nor an a priori method whose norms precede its subject matter. I use it because of its wide acceptance. Though Hegel refrains from using this formula, it has nevertheless been ascribed to him in many textbooks and in the public's mind.
But, beyond those generalities, it is impossible to formalize a set of mandatory a priori rules which must be followed at all times and in all particular cases. These areas deal with allegedly simple, self-identical units of discourse, which are dominated by the form of identity of a substance, not a subject, and therefore must obey the law of noncontradiction. Subject-like dialectical logic is appropriate to all areas which ex- press the movement of self-actualizing systems: the philosophy of mind, of being ontology , of society, culture, and history.
Above all, it is the way philosophy itself is to construe and relate to its objects. The chief methodological demand implied here is Introduction 31 that philosophical truth be shaped as an organic totality, which main- tains itself through its own negations. Since philosophy must express the structure of reality from within, and that structure is subject- like, true philosophy must share that structure, as well.
This reading is only partially correct. When Hegel asserts that the true is the whole, he immediately adds his own explanation: The true is the whole. Yet the whole is but the essence which brings itself to fulfillment through its development. Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is the absolute what it is in truth; and herein consists its nature — to be actual, subject, or becoming-its-own-self.
Therefore the claim that the true is the whole says more than the ordinary coherence theory. First, Hegel is speaking of an organic, or dialectical, coherence, not of external links of inference connecting static, self-identical items. The philosopher cannot therefore abstract the result from its genesis and view the process of development as a scaffold to be disposed of when the goal is reached, as can be done with mathematical demonstrations and analytical arguments.
This is true not only of the history of philosophy, but also of a special kind of process which affects the conceptual system from within. In the finished system of philosophy, every member will point to all of the 32 Introduction others in a process of negation and negation-of-negation, so that our thought cannot rest until it runs the whole course of the system; and even then it will not hold on to it as something static and fin- ished, but rather as a self-repeating conceptual movement.
In this sense the history of philosophy is preserved as aufgehoben in the pure system of philosophy. The diachronic process that has generated the system is sublated negated but preserved in new form within the synchronic movement of the system of philosophy that emerges from it. And if we offer some general proposition or formula as a concluding summary, again we shall have an abstract and unrealized universal which cannot, as such, be true; rather, in so far as it is abstract and only part of the story, it is false.
An ironic illustration of this is given by our own dictum, the true is the whole. Because it stands in the Preface as an abstract general- ity severed from its systematic context — namely, from the remain- der of the book which demonstrates its meaning by carrying it out — the dictum fails to convey its own purported meaning and is, dialectically speaking, untrue. Thirdly, the true is the whole not only in the sense that its diverse elements form a unified system of discourse, but also in that knowl- edge is therein unified with its object.
Hence the ontic character of truth, by virtue of which it is truth. It is therefore the ontic nature of truth from which its methodological conditions are also derived, including the principle of coherence. Truth has been traditionally, and notoriously, defined as adequatio rex et intellectus — the conformity of the thing and the intellect or the concept.
This definition views the thing and the concept as two foreign elements which share nothing in common. There is a Introduction 33 world of things on the one hand and a world of thoughts on the other, and the latter must conform to the former. Hegel has no problem accepting the nominal definition because it is so broad and says so litde , but rejects the dualism inherent in it. If the con- cept agrees with reality, it is because reality itself has evolved until it agrees with its concept which includes its self-knowledge through philosophy.
Or putting it conversely, they agree because the con- cept is latent in reality as its essence, and drives reality to develop and agree with it that is, in the final analysis, to agree with itself, with its own essence. These two, reality and the concept, are not foreign elements but two complementary moments within a single dialectical process. This view presupposes that being does not change but is forever static, only our concepts about it evolve until they correspond to it. Yet Hegel maintains there is evolution and self-actualization in being itself, mediated by human action and knowledge.
He also rejects an important element in Kant: the thesis that Concepts are external to reality and injected into it or imposed on it by human self-consciousness. And as reality evolves towards its Concept, it en- ables knowledge, too, to evolve ever more clearly and to con- sciously explicate that implicit Concept. In summary, the true is the whole, but this whole includes the process of its own genesis, as well as the moment of being with which it stands in a dialectical relation.
Only in this way does the system of philosophy form an organic, self-grounding whole which, like Spinoza's causa sui, bears witness to its own truth.